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 NOTE 
The “Undue Hardship” Test: The Dangers of 
a Subjective Test in Determining the 
Dischargeability of Student Loan Debt in 
Bankruptcy 
Conway v. National Collegiate Trust (In re Conway), 542 B.R. 855 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2015) 
Rebekah Keller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In today’s culture of living life on credit, post-secondary education loans 
have become the most popular method for American students to pay for their 
college degrees.  Further, “[t]he costs for a higher education are among the 
fastest-rising costs in American culture today.  Since 1980, tuition costs at U.S. 
colleges and universities have risen 757 percent.”1  With $1.2 trillion in current 
outstanding student loan debt,2 approximately 43 percent of the 22 million 
Americans with federal student loan debt are not making payments on their 
loans.3  In 2014, 69 percent of college seniors at public and nonprofit colleges 
graduated with some student loan debt.4  Missouri students alone graduated 
with an average of $25,844 in student loan debt in 2014.5  Coupled with the  
* B.A., Macalester College, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2017.  Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I would 
like to offer a sincere thank you to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for her constant 
support and guidance throughout law school, particularly through the learning, writing, 
and editing process of this Note. 
 1. Cecillia Barr, Students & Debt, DEBT.ORG, https://www.debt.org/students/ 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (“In comparison, food and electricity costs have risen about 
150 percent and gasoline prices have risen more than 400 percent over the same period 
of time.”). 
 2. Id. 
 3. John Hayward, Student Loan Bubble Update: Some 40 Percent of Borrowers 
Aren’t Making Payments, BREITBART (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2016/04/07/student-loan-bubble-update-some-40-percent-of-borrowers-
arent-making-payments/. 
 4. Debbie Cochrane & Matthew Reed, Student Debt and the Class of 2014, INST. 
FOR C. ACCESS & SUCCESS (Oct. 2015), http://ticas.org/sites/de-
fault/files/pub_files/classof2014.pdf. 
 5. Id. at 6–7 tbl.3.  In a ten-year study conducted by the Institute for College 
Access and Success, the changes in student loan debt between 2004 and 2014 were 
analyzed and compared on a state-by-state basis.  Id. at 1–35. 
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high unemployment rates of a recovering economy, student loan debt poses the 
greatest obstacle for young adults starting out on their own.6  Such large 
amounts of debt can have a serious impact on the futures of these student debt-
ors.  In a recent policy analysis paper, Mark Kantrowitz, a nationally recog-
nized expert on student loan debt and financial aid, found: 
[S]tudents who graduate with excessive debt are about 10% more likely 
to say that it caused delays in major life events, such a buying a home, 
getting married, or having children.  They are also about 20% more 
likely to say that their debt influenced their employment plans, causing 
them to take a job outside their field, to work more than they desired, 
or to work more than one job.7 
One unique characteristic of student loan debt, compared with other types 
of debt that a consumer may take on, is its status as a non-dischargeable debt 
under the Bankruptcy Code.8  Thus, student loan debt is not automatically dis-
chargeable when debtors file for bankruptcy and receive a discharge of their 
other debts in a bankruptcy proceeding.9  This creates a hardship for debtors 
who have come out of bankruptcy still saddled with massive student loan debt, 
leaving them with little hope they will ever rid themselves of their accumulated 
debt.10 
Even so, debtors continue to attempt to have their student loan debt dis-
charged in bankruptcy.  Because of the difficult standard put in place by Con-
gress, commonly referred to as the “undue hardship” requirement, this requires 
some creative arguments on the part of these debtors to convince a court that 
their student loan debt imposes enough of a hardship that it could be catego-
rized as “undue.”11  In addition to its non-dischargeability, student loan debt 
can impose different obstacles on borrowers, depending on whether the debt 
agreement is for federally or privately funded student loans.  Even though nei-
ther federal nor private student loan debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy, their 
lasting effects on debtors can be very different.  This Note explores the varying 
 
 6. Data and Statistics, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., http://labor.mo.gov/data 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 7. Mark Kantrowitz, Why the Student Loan Crisis Is Even Worse Than People 
Think, TIME (Jan. 11, 2016), http://time.com/money/4168510/why-student-loan-crisis-
is-worse-than-people-think/. 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
 9. Id.; see also id. § 524. 
 10. Marc S. Stern & Larry B. Feinstein, Debts That Can Follow You to the Grave: 
What You Can’t Get Away with in Bankruptcy, AM. B., http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_in-
dex/debts.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2017) (“Section 523 deals with particular claims.  
These are the debts that may ‘follow you to the grave.’”). 
 11. § 523(a)(8).  See, e.g., Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan 
Discharges and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012). 
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impacts that public and private student loan debt can have on borrowers both 
before and after a bankruptcy. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Chelsea Ann Conway, a single college graduate, filed for relief under 
Chapter 712 of the Bankruptcy Code in December 2009.13  Ms. Conway re-
ceived a discharge in March 2010, and her case was closed.14  However, in 
December 2011, Ms. Conway filed a motion to reopen her case, which was 
granted, in order to determine whether her non-dischargeable student loans 
could be discharged under the undue hardship exception of the Bankruptcy 
Code.15  In August and November 2012, two of the three creditors holding Ms. 
Conway’s student loan debt filed stipulations to discharge the debt owed to 
them by Ms. Conway.16  This left Ms. Conway with fifteen outstanding student 
loans that survived her Chapter 7 bankruptcy.17  The fifteen remaining out-
standing student loan debts continued to be disputed by the creditor in the case, 
National Collegiate Trust (“NCT”).18 
Ms. Conway’s student loans comprised of debt amounts borrowed be-
tween 2003 and 2005 while she was enrolled in college at Webster University 
in St. Louis, Missouri.19  Ms. Conway borrowed a total of $37,100 from NCT 
while attaining her bachelor’s degree at Webster University.20  She graduated 
from Webster University in 2005 with a Bachelor of Arts in Media Communi-
cations.21  After attaining her degree, Ms. Conway enrolled at Saint Louis 
Community College and completed additional coursework.22  In order to pay  
 12. A debtor or debtor organization may also file for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 
and Chapter 13; however, this Note focuses on the organization and structure of Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy proceedings only because that was the subject of the instant case.  See 
generally 11 U.S.C. chs. 7, 11, 13. 
 13. Conway v. Nat’l Collegiate Tr. (In re Conway), 489 B.R. 828, 830 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mo. 2013) [hereinafter Conway Bankr. Ct. I], rev’d and remanded, 495 B.R. 416 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), reversal aff’d, 559 F. App’x 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. at n.2. 
 17. Id. at 830. 
 18. See id.  Ms. Conway also still has approximately $18,000 in federally guaran-
teed student loans that were not part of the proceedings and are currently in repayment 
under an income-contingent repayment plan, and Ms. Conway states there is no similar 
plan available for private student loans, like the ones at issue in Ms. Conway’s case.  
Conway v. Nat’l Collegiate Tr. (In re Conway), 495 B.R. 416, 418 n.4 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2013) [hereinafter Conway B.A.P. I], aff’d, 559 F. App’x 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per cu-
riam). 
 19. See Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. at 830. 
 20. See id.  The interest rates on the loans ranged from 3.25 percent to 5.15 percent.  
Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
3
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for these courses, Ms. Conway borrowed an additional $33,000 from NCT 
from 2005 to 2007.23  In October 2005, Ms. Conway began a full-time job, but 
in July 2007, she was laid off.24  She began working part-time in temporary 
positions, while also receiving unemployment benefits.25  Ms. Conway found 
full-time work again in December 2007 but was again laid off in September 
2008 and again began receiving unemployment benefits while working in part-
time temporary positions.26  Since April 2009, Ms. Conway has been waitress-
ing part-time at two restaurants.27 
Ms. Conway had an adjusted gross income of $21,115 in 2008; $16,127 
in 2009; $25,256 in 2010; and $25,390 in 2011.28  In her pleadings, Ms. Con-
way estimated her monthly income as of July 2012 to be $2461.45.29  Ms. Con-
way had also received $625 in settlement proceeds in relation to a car accident 
in August 2012.30  Ms. Conway reported her total monthly income at the time 
of her hearing to be $2040.36 and her total monthly expenses to be $1737.25.31  
This left Ms. Conway with a net monthly income of $303.11.32  Since 2005, 
NCT had granted Ms. Conway part-time deferments, temporary forbearances, 
and forbearances on all fifteen loans.33  As of 2012, Ms. Conway had repaid a 
total of $5734.48.34 
Ms. Conway further stated that she suffered from depression, anxiety, At-
tention-Deficit Disorder (“ADD”), scoliosis, arthritis, and other ailments that 
 
 23. Id. at 831. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  The bankruptcy court also noted Ms. Conway’s income tax refunds from 
2008 through 2011, totaling approximately $3000.  Id. 
 29. See id.  Ms. Conway reported working approximately twenty hours per week 
at The Boathouse in Forest Park at $1665.55 per month and approximately twenty hours 
per week at P.F. Chang’s China Bistro at $795.90 per month in July 2012 and $1379.97 
per month at The Boathouse in Forest Park in December 2012.  Id. 
 30. Id.  Ms. Conway reported she would be receiving an additional $1000 as part 
of this settlement agreement in the future.  Id. 
 31. Id.  The bankruptcy court broke down Ms. Conway’s monthly expenses to be: 
$257.50 in rent; $98 for electricity and heating; $158 for cell phone service; $300 for 
food; $50 for clothing; $25 for laundry and dry cleaning; $30 for medical and dental 
care; $380 for transportation; $32 for personal care; and $97 for miscellaneous items.  
Id.  The change in Ms. Conway’s monthly income between July 2012 and the time of 
trial in December 2012 was attributable to fluctuations in her hours at one of her wait-
ressing jobs in the fall and winter.  Id. 
 32. Id.  The bankruptcy court made sure to note that these income amounts had 
increased since the time of Ms. Conway’s Chapter 7 Petition only three years prior, 
where Ms. Conway reported a monthly income of $1397.67 and monthly expenses of 
$1350.50, leaving a net monthly income of $47.17.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 830. 
 34. See id. 
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limited her ability to work.35  Ms. Conway also stated that these ailments would 
continue to limit her future capabilities to maintain gainful employment.36  Ms. 
Conway also asserted that, despite her best efforts, she was unable to find any 
kind of higher paying, full-time employment in the current job market.37  Fi-
nally, she argued that her bachelor’s degree in media communications was use-
less to her in finding gainful employment because it provided her with none of 
the skills, experiences, or expertise necessary for open positions.38 
In reopening her bankruptcy case, Ms. Conway relied on Brunner v. New 
York State Higher Education Services Corp.,39 arguing that her outstanding 
student loan debts should be discharged because they created an “undue hard-
ship” on her and prevented her from receiving a fresh start once her Chapter 7 
proceedings were resolved and closed.40  Ms. Conway argued she was unable 
to repay over $118,500 in student loan debt on her current income and that, 
with her useless degree and ailments, the possibility of finding more gainful 
employment in the future that would allow her to pay these loans was un-
likely.41 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted 
Ms. Conway’s petition to reopen her case in order to determine whether her 
student loan debt did in fact impose an undue hardship on Ms. Conway and 
should be dischargeable.42  However, the court rejected Ms. Conway’s argu-
ment that the court rely on the test set forth in Brunner.43  Instead, the court’s 
analysis depended on the Eighth Circuit’s “totality-of-the-circumstances”44 ap-
proach to the undue hardship standard.45  Based on this totality-of-the-circum-
stances test, the court found that Ms. Conway’s reasonably reliable future fi-
nancial resources,46 combined with her reasonable living expenses, meant that 
 
 35. Id. at 832. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id.  Ms. Conway contended that she sent out over 200 resumes and job 
applications.  Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
 40. Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. at 832; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
 41. See Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. at 832. 
 42. Id. at 830. 
 43. Id. at 833. 
 44. See id. (citing Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d. 549, 
554 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Brunner test)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. The court looks at the debtor’s past, current, and possible future financial re-
sources.  In re Wegfehrt, 10 B.R. 826, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (citing REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 
137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. II 140–41 n.17 (1973)).  It determines, based on infor-
mation provided by the debtor, what the debtor’s future resources may look like and 
determines if those are reasonably reliable.  It is a guessing game that depends on the 
debtor’s ability to prove his or her financial dependence/independence. 
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Ms. Conway would be able to repay NCT in the future without an undue hard-
ship.47  Further, the court found that Ms. Conway’s “written submissions to this 
Court evidence” that she “is articulate, poised, intelligent and quite capable. . . 
. [S]he undoubtedly has the education and transferable skills that will allow her 
to obtain a more lucrative career in the future.”48  The bankruptcy court also 
found that Ms. Conway’s medical expenses, as part of her monthly living ex-
penses, would likely be reduced by the addition of health insurance if she found 
a full-time job.49  The court held that Ms. Conway’s argument failed the total-
ity-of-the-circumstances test, and thus her student loan debt continued to be 
non-dischargeable.50 
Ms. Conway appealed the bankruptcy decision to the Bankruptcy Appel-
late Panel (“BAP”) for the Eighth Circuit.51  The BAP reviewed Ms. Conway’s 
case de novo52 and ultimately reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding and re-
manded the case to the bankruptcy court.53  First, the BAP reviewed the facts 
provided to the bankruptcy court regarding Ms. Conway’s income and ex-
penses and concluded that nothing in the record controverted the bankruptcy 
 
 47. Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. at 836. 
 48. Id. at 834–35.  While Ms. Conway’s pro se representation in her bankruptcy 
case led the court to deny her request to discharge her student loans, based, in part, on 
her competence, intelligence, and future job prospects, other debtors’ pro se represen-
tations have led courts to reach very different conclusions in the past.  See Rose v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. (In re Rose), 215 B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (concluding 
that the debtor’s student loans should be discharged, in part, because the debtor’s pro 
se representation of herself in the case was so poor that the court highly doubted the 
debtor’s ability to procure “more lucrative employment in the foreseeable future”). 
 49. See Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. at 835–36. 
 50. See id. at 836. 
 51. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. 416, 418 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 559 F. 
App’x 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).  When appealing a decision from the federal 
bankruptcy court, the petitioner can appeal to the federal district court or to the Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel for the district in which the debtor resides.  The Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel is a panel of appellate court judges and district court judges who are 
considered to be specialists in bankruptcy law and hear bankruptcy court appeals.  Ap-
pealing to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel requires both parties to agree on venue.  See 
Samuel R. Maizel, The “Who, What, When, Where, Why, and How” of Appeals in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings – Generally, OFFS. U.S. ATT’YS (Mar. 15, 1996), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/civil-resource-manual-96-who-what-when-where-why-
and-how-appeals-bankruptcy-proceedings (last updated Mar. 2007). 
 52. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. at 419 (“Undue hardship is a question of law which 
we review de novo.  Subsidiary findings of fact on which the legal conclusion is based 
are reviewed for clear error.” (quoting Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 
775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009))). 
 53. Id. at 418. 
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court’s finding of fact that Ms. Conway’s current income was stable.54  How-
ever, the BAP did not agree with the bankruptcy court as to Ms. Conway’s 
“reasonably reliable future financial resources.”55 
The BAP noted that Ms. Conway had not made much more than $25,000 
per year in the eight years since she graduated from college, which indicated 
that Ms. Conway’s case was not one where a debtor is intentionally underem-
ployed.56  The BAP also noted that, even though the bankruptcy court found 
that Ms. Conway had a net income, after expenses, of approximately $300 per 
month, the minimum principal and interest payment due to NCT is $846.16 per 
month.57  The BAP ultimately held that “[w]hile Ms. Conway may have the 
‘possibility’ of earning a higher income in the future, there is no evidence to 
support that possibility.  [The court] will not substitute assumptions or specu-
lation for reasonably reliable facts.”58  Based on this, the BAP found that the 
bankruptcy court’s finding that Ms. Conway’s possible future financial re-
sources made it likely that she would be able to pay NCT the entire debt was 
clearly erroneous.59 
The BAP relied on Education Credit Management Corp. v. Jesperson60 
in determining that the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Ms. Conway’s 
monthly expenses would be reduced when she received health insurance 
through a full-time job was erroneous.61  It reasoned that a court cannot “en-
gage in speculation when determining net income and reasonable and neces-
sary expenses.”62  The BAP then rejected NCT’s argument that Ms. Conway 
had sufficient disposable income to repay part of her loans, and as such, the 
loans should not be discharged.63  The BAP rejected this theory, pointing out 
that no case law in the Eighth Circuit authorized the court to “partially dis-
charge” a student loan.64  The BAP was wary of such “subjective application 
of § 523(a)(8),” referring to concerns about inequities, unpredictability, and a 
 
 54. Id. at 420–21. 
 55. Id. at 421. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 422. 
 58. Id. (quoting Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 
1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 571 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 61. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. at 422. 
 62. Id. (quoting Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 780). 
 63. Id. at 423–24. 
 64. Id. at 423 (“The court does not have the authority to modify the payment terms 
of a student loan or to discharge a partial amount of principal or accrued interest.” 
(quoting Hawkins v. Buena Vista Coll. (In re Hawkins), 187 B.R. 294, 300–01 (Bankr. 
N.D. Iowa 1995))); see also Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re An-
dresen), 232 B.R. 127, 136–37 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999) (criticizing “partial discharge” 
theory without deciding the issue), abrogated by Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In 
re Long), 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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lack of uniformity in outcomes under such an approach.65  Next, the BAP noted 
that Ms. Conway’s debt was actually fifteen individual loans, all held by NCT, 
and determined that the undue hardship analysis should be applied to each loan 
separately under § 523(a)(8).66  The court then remanded Ms. Conway’s case 
back to the bankruptcy court to allow the court to apply § 523(a)(8) on a sepa-
rate loan-by-loan basis and determine the repayment of which, if any, of Ms. 
Conway’s fifteen student loans imposed an undue hardship on her after bank-
ruptcy.67 
NCT appealed to the Eighth Circuit the BAP’s reversal of the bankruptcy 
court’s determination that Ms. Conway had “reasonably reliable future finan-
cial resources with which to pay her entire student loan debt to NTC [sic].”68  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s judgment, finding that there was no 
abuse of discretion in the BAP’s decision to remand for further proceedings.69 
On remand, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was 
tasked with applying the undue hardship analysis on a loan-by-loan basis to 
determine the dischargeability of Ms. Conway’s fifteen outstanding student 
loan debts held by NCT.70  As instructed by the BAP, the court was required 
to conduct a loan-by-loan analysis based on Ms. Conway’s “present disposable 
income.”71  However, the BAP did not determine the start and end dates from 
which the bankruptcy court was to determine Ms. Conway’s present monthly 
income.72  The bankruptcy court based its analysis on Ms. Conway’s disposa-
ble income for an entire year, starting in November 2013 and ending in October 
2014, based on Ms. Conway’s submissions of her financial resources to the 
court for that year.73  The court then found Ms. Conway’s present disposable 
income to be $170.30 per month.74  Based on this amount of disposable income, 
the court found that Ms. Conway could repay loans 1, 2, 3, and 9 with no undue 
hardship to her.75  The court then discharged student loans 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 
 
 65. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. at 423. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 423–24. 
 68. Conway v. Nat’l Collegiate Tr. (In re Conway), 559 F. App’x 610, 610 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam) [hereinafter Conway 8th Cir.]. 
 69. Id. at 611. 
 70. Conway v. Nat’l Collegiate Tr. (In re Conway), Ch. 7 Case No. 09-52394-399, 
Adv. No. 12-4033-659, slip op. at 1 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Con-
way Bankr. Ct. II], aff’d, 542 B.R. 855 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015). 
 71. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. at 424. 
 72. Conway Bankr. Ct. II, slip op. at 2. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 5 (“Therefore, Debtor’s disposable income which this Court deems to be 
Debtor’s present disposable income is $170.30 ($1957-$1786.70).”). 
 75. Id. at 6.  The court determined that the combined monthly installment payment 
of $167.11 of these four loans fell within Ms. Conway’s estimated present monthly 
disposable income of $170.30 but did not exceed her present monthly disposable in-
come.  Id. 
8
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12, 13, 14, and 15 because repayment of those loan amounts constituted undue 
hardship.76 
Ms. Conway requested that the bankruptcy court amend its judgment due 
to her increased expenses and decreased income since November 2014, but the 
court denied the request.77  Ms. Conway then appealed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision that some, but not all, of her student loans were dischargeable to the 
BAP, seeking to have the remaining student loan debts discharged.78  Ms. Con-
way argued the bankruptcy court erred in determining that some of her student 
loans remain non-dischargeable because it did not take into consideration 
changes in her income and expenses after the court’s cut-off date.79  Using an 
abuse of discretion standard of review, the BAP rejected Ms. Conway’s argu-
ment, finding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Ms. Conway’s motion to amend the judgment and discharge her remaining four 
student loan debts.80 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In order to examine the complicated nature of the BAP’s decision in In re 
Conway, and its implications to individuals in the Eighth Circuit with student 
loan debt, a thorough analysis of the Bankruptcy Code and current case law on 
student loan non-dischargeability is necessary.  This Part addresses the frame-
work of the federal bankruptcy statutes and the exceptions to the discharge of 
debt in bankruptcy.  Next, it examines the current student loan system and com-
pares federal and private student loan programs.  Lastly, this Part examines the 
current case law regarding the discharge of student loan debt and how the cir-
cuits have split regarding which facts-and-circumstances test controls when 
making determinations of “undue hardship,” as required by statute. 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Conway v. Nat’l Collegiate Tr. (In re Conway), 542 B.R. 855, 856–57 (B.A.P. 
8th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Conway B.A.P. II]. 
 78. Id. at 856. 
 79. Id. at 857.  Ms. Conway alleged that she was laid off from one of her jobs after 
November 2014, her federal student loan payments and health insurance expenses in-
creased after November 2014, and that the court erred in reducing her monthly miscel-
laneous expenses.  Id. 
 80. Id. at 859.  The court noted,  
 
A bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion for new trial, or to alter or amend 
a judgment, is reviewed with deference and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of discretion.  The bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when 
it fails to apply the proper legal standard or bases its order on findings of 
fact that are clearly erroneous. 
 
Id. at 857 (citations omitted). 
9
Keller: The “Undue Hardship” Test
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
220 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
A.  Bankruptcy Statutes and the Exception to Student Loan Discharge 
Title XI of the U.S. Code codifies the federal bankruptcy statutes.81  Title 
XI also designates the different types of bankruptcy filings available.82  Con-
sumer debtors may file for bankruptcy under three different code chapters: 
Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13.83  The debtors’ first duty under each 
filing option is to report all income, personal property, and other assets in his 
or her bankruptcy petitions.84  Generally, all property in debtors’ estates is 
available to pay creditors; however, debtors can exempt certain portions of 
their property from their bankruptcy estates.85  Section 522 of Title XI estab-
lishes allowable exemptions.86  In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, non-
exempt property and assets must be turned over to a bankruptcy trustee.87  The 
assets and property will be distributed and sold to creditors.88  Once non-ex-
empt assets have been used to pay off creditors, the bankruptcy court will issue 
a discharge of the remaining outstanding debts.89  However, not all debts re-
ported in a debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding are dischargeable.90 
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the exceptions to dis-
charge.91  Among those exceptions, the most common debts that are prohibited 
from discharge in bankruptcy are debts incurred by fraud or false representa-
tion,92 child support obligations,93 alimony obligations,94 federal taxes or tax 
penalties,95 and federal student loans or other educational loan obligations.96  
Specifically, § 523(a)(8) states that a discharge of student loans available under 
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding does not discharge any student loan debt  
 81. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 82. Id. §§ 701, 1101, 1301. 
 83. Id. §§ 701, 1101, 1301.  Additionally, family farmers and fishermen, as de-
fined under the code, can file for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 12.  Id. § 109(f). 
 84. Id. § 521. 
 85. Id. § 522. 
 86. Id.  Some common exemptions include: debtors’ interests in real estate – up to 
a certain value, interest in a motor vehicle – up to a certain value, jewelry used primarily 
for personal or family reasons, and furniture, appliances, and clothing – up to a certain 
value.  Id. §§ 522(d)(1)–(5). 
 87. Id. § 704. 
 88. Secured creditors are paid back before unsecured creditors.  Id. § 502.  Certain 
unsecured creditors have priority over other unsecured creditors.  Id. § 507. 
 89. Discharge in Bankruptcy – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-
bankruptcy-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 90. Id. 
 91. 11 U.S.C. § 523. 
 92. Id. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 93. Id. § 523(a)(5). 
 94. Id. § 523(a)(15). 
 95. Id. § 523(a)(1). 
 96. Id. § 523(a)(8).  There are nineteen categories of non-dischargeable debts in a 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  Discharge in Bankruptcy, supra note 89. 
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“unless excepting such debt from discharge . . . would impose an undue hard-
ship on the debtor . . . for . . . an educational benefit [] or loan made, insured, 
or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or . . . any other educational loan that is 
a qualified education loan.”97  However, the statute does not define “undue 
hardship.”  The bankruptcy courts are thus required to determine the definition 
of “undue hardship” on a case-by-case basis. 
Section 523(a)(8) was amended to include student loan debt as an excep-
tion to dischargeability in 1978.98  Section 523(a)(8) was designed by Congress 
to “prevent abuse of the bankruptcy system by student borrowers who reap the 
benefits of access to higher education but seek to escape repayment of their 
student loan obligations upon graduation.”99  The amendment protected both 
federal and private student loans lenders from having their loan agreements 
discharged in bankruptcy without a showing of undue hardship.100 
B.  Federal Versus Private Student Loans 
Federal student loans are funds set aside by the federal government to 
supplement post-secondary educational costs for U.S. citizens.101  Private 
loans, on the other hand, are funds provided by a private lender like a bank, 
credit union, or school.102  Federal student loans have fixed interest rates and 
income-based repayment plans that are often not available with private student 
loans.103  Due to the adjustable interest rates on most private student loans, 
private student loans tend to be more expensive overall.104  In addition to the 
different interest rates, federal and private student loans have different eligibil-
ity standards; most private loans require a credit check and/or a cosigner, 
whereas federal student loan programs are mostly need-based, relying on the 
student’s income, and do not require credit checks.105 
 
 97. § 523(a)(8). 
 98. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 466–75 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6093–94.  At first, only federal student loans were made non-dischargeable, but 
in 2005, private student loans were added to the statute.  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 8-109, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (cod-
ified at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)). 
 99. Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. 828, 833 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013) (citing Long 
v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003)), reversed 
and remanded, 495 B.R. 416 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), reversal aff’d, 559 F. App’x 610 
(8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 100. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 101. Federal Versus Private Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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The major characteristics of federal and private student loans that affect 
how and who borrows what are the interest rates, repayment plans, and defer-
ment and forbearance options.106  Federal student loans offer fixed interest rates 
that are set by Congress and rarely change; the last time the federal Stafford 
Loan limits were changed was in 2008.107  Generally, lending exists because 
of the lender’s ability to impose interest rates.108  Rates have varied from in-
dustry to industry and from program to program over the years.109  Lenders 
have the ability to adjust interest rates for a variety of reasons.110  Currently, 
federal student loan interest rates are between 4.29 percent and 6.84 percent 
per loan.111  Most private student loans use an adjustable interest rate, which 
currently ranges from 0.25 percent to 15.74 percent.112  In the student lending 
industry, interest rates also serve another purpose to many private student loan 
lenders: an insurance policy.  The interest rates attached to private student loans 
act both as an incentive when taking on riskier borrowers and as a bonus be-
cause student loans are non-dischargeable – the interest accrues on private stu-
dent loans until they are paid off in full.113 
In addition, federal student loans offer many repayment options; in fact, 
most have been adopted to encourage debtors to make monthly payments on 
their loans, no matter how low their income.114  Income-based repayment plans 
allow borrowers to set up monthly payment amounts they can actually afford 
based on their monthly income, and in most cases, the remaining unpaid bal-
ance of one’s federal loans will be forgiven after twenty-five years.115  Private 
student loans often do not have income-based repayment options but are lim-
ited to a set five-, ten-, fifteen-, or twenty-year period to repay.116  Federal stu-
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Private Student Loans, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/privatestudent-
loans.phtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 108. See generally SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST 
RATES (4th ed. 2005). 
 109. See id. 
 110. STEVE SURANOVIC, POLICY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 887 
(2012), http://2012books.lardbucket.org/books/policy-and-theory-of-international-
economics/index.html. 
 111. Interest Rates and Fees, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studen-
taid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/interest-rates (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 112. Private Student Loans, supra note 107.  Interest rates on adjustable interest 
rate loans are in part dependent on the borrower’s credit score, which means borrowers 
with lower credit scores will have interest rates closer to the 15.74 percent interest rates 
instead of the 0.25 percent rates. 
 113. In theory, this means that, as interest accrues, a debtor in financial hardship 
will be paying on his or her student loans forever. 
 114. Federal Versus Private Loans, supra note 101. 
 115. Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studen-
taid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 116. Private Student Loans, supra note 107. 
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dent loans also offer deferment and forbearance options that most private stu-
dent loans do not provide.117  Deferral allows a borrower to enter a grace period 
of sorts for various pre-approved situations, like continuing schooling or, in 
some short-term periods, for hardship.118  Forbearance is an option for borrow-
ers with federal loans who do not qualify for deferral.119  Most acceptable rea-
sons for forbearance revolve around financial hardship, illness, and National 
Guard or teaching service.120 
C.  Circuit Splits in the Case Law 
In determining whether student loan debts impose an undue hardship on 
a debtor in light of her financial circumstances, federal district courts have es-
sentially established two different tests.121  The Brunner test was officially in-
stituted in 1987 in an appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, which held that the bankruptcy court erred in discharging 
the debtor’s student loans based on undue hardship.122  The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court and adopted a three-part 
standard for determining undue hardship, requiring: 
(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and ex-
penses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her dependents if 
forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indi-
cating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion 
of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has 
made good faith efforts to repay the loans.123 
The court in Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp. based 
this test on the reasonable interpretation of the legislative history, prior case 
law, and the original congressional intent behind the adoption of § 523(a)(8) to 
make discharge of “student loans more difficult than that of other nonexcepted 
debt.”124  The court also reasoned that requiring evidence of current inability 
to pay and any exceptional circumstances demonstrating a continuing inability 
to repay in the future would more reliably justify the hardship as “undue.”125  
 
 117. Federal Versus Private Loans, supra note 101. 
 118. Deferment and Forbearance, FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Compare Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 
(2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam), with Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 
F.3d 549, 554–55 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 122. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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Under the Brunner test, the debtor has the burden of proving “undue hardship” 
through evidence of exceptional present and future circumstances demonstrat-
ing an inability to repay the debts over an extended period of time.126 
In Brunner, the debtor, Marie Brunner, was a single, able-bodied individ-
ual who failed to meet the burden of proving that undue hardship would result 
if her student loans were not discharged.127  She failed to produce evidence 
tending to indicate a lack of job prospects, either currently or in the future.128  
The court also noted that she had graduated from college only ten months prior 
to the time of the hearing, which did not tend to prove that she was currently, 
and would continue to be, enduring exceptional circumstances that would make 
her unable to repay her student loans.129  Even more telling was the fact that 
she had been repaying her student loans for only one month at the time she 
filed for discharge, meaning that she had made no attempt to defer or forebear 
her payments prior to requesting that the court discharge her debt com-
pletely.130  The court affirmed the district court’s reversal of the discharge of 
her student loans and concluded “[s]uch conduct does not evidence a good faith 
attempt to repay her student loans.”131 
The Brunner test has been adopted by the majority of bankruptcy and ap-
pellate courts across the country for determining undue hardship imposed by 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 396–97. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 397. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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the non-dischargeability of student loans.132  Not every circuit has been per-
suaded to adopt the Brunner test, however.133  In 2003, the Eighth Circuit be-
came the first circuit to reject the Brunner test for undue hardship determina-
tions.134  In Long v. Educational Credit Management Corp.,135 the Eighth Cir-
cuit instead adopted a “totality-of-the-circumstances” test.136 
In Long, the debtor, Nanci Long, filed for bankruptcy in 2000 after bat-
tling numerous health issues that ultimately pushed the debtor to quit her job.137  
Despite dutifully paying down her student loan debt for approximately ten 
 
 132. See Easterling v. Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(holding that debtors must satisfy the Brunner test in order to prove student loan repay-
ment imposes an undue hardship); Lepre v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Lepre), 530 F. 
App’x 121, 123 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“We, along with the majority of our sister 
courts, assess whether a debtor faces undue hardship by employing the three-pronged 
test set forth Brunner v. New York Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d 
Cir. 1987).”); Spence v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Spence), 541 F.3d 538, 542 
(4th Cir. 2008) (adopting the Brunner test as it was adopted by the Fourth Circuit in 
Educational Credit Management Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 
400 (4th Cir. 2005)); Ostrom v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Ostrom), 283 F. App’x 
283, 285 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“As the measure for ‘undue hardship’ in this 
context, we have adopted the test articulated in the Second Circuit’s decision in Brun-
ner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).”); 
Fields v. Sallie Mae Servs. Corp. (In re Fields), 286 F. App’x 246, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“The Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘undue hardship,’ and, following this circuit’s 
precedent at the time, the bankruptcy court looked to the test announced in Brunner v. 
New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987), for 
guidance on this issue.”); Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 794 F.3d 756, 758 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (“To determine which situations constitute an ‘undue hardship,’ we have 
adopted the Brunner test for student loan discharge proceedings . . . .”); Hedlund v. 
Educ. Res. Inst. Inc., 718 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 2013) (“To determine if a debtor has 
shown undue hardship, we follow the three-part test from Brunner.”); Roe v. Coll. Ac-
cess Network (In re Roe), 295 F. App’x 927, 929 (10th Cir. 2008) (“To evaluate 
whether an undue hardship exists, we adopted the three-part test articulated in Brunner 
. . . .”); Wieckiewicz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 443 F. App’x 449, 451 (11th Cir. 
2011) (per curiam) (“The Bankruptcy Code does not define ‘undue hardship,’ but we 
have adopted the standard set forth in Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.”). 
 133. See Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th 
Cir. 2003); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 798 (B.A.P. 
1st Cir. 2010). 
 134. In re Long, 322 F.3d at 553. 
 135. Id. at 549. 
 136. Id. at 553 (citing Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re An-
drews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981)). 
 137. Id. at 551–52. 
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years, Ms. Long still owed $76,000.138  Based on these facts – as well as addi-
tional circumstances and Ms. Long’s financial information – the bankruptcy 
court discharged the debtor’s student loan debt owed to the Educational Credit 
Management Corporation (“ECMC”), finding that the debt would impose an 
undue hardship on the debtor, and the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
determination.139 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BAP’s decision and rejected 
ECMC’s request that the court adopt the Brunner test for determining whether 
student loan debt imposed an undue hardship on a debtor requesting relief.140  
The court reaffirmed the analysis to be used in the Eighth Circuit to determine 
undue hardship as the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in Andrews v. 
South Dakota Student Loan Assistance Corp.141  The Eighth Circuit, in adopt-
ing the totality-of-the-circumstances test, openly utilized a less restrictive test 
to determine undue hardship.142  The court reasoned that any particular test 
would undermine the inherent discretion provided for in § 523(a)(8)(B) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.143  In relying on the more flexible totality-of-the-circum-
stances test, the Eighth Circuit stressed the importance of examining the par-
ticular facts and circumstances that surround each bankruptcy situation.144  In 
order to facilitate such an examination of facts and circumstances, the totality-
of-the-circumstances test requires the bankruptcy court to consider: “(1) the 
debtor’s past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) a 
calculation of the debtor’s and her dependent’s reasonable necessary living ex-
penses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding each 
particular bankruptcy case.”145 
More recently, the totality-of-the-circumstances test was favored in Edu-
cational Credit Management Corp. v. Jesperson.146  In Jesperson, the debtor, 
Mark Jesperson, filed for bankruptcy, seeking a discharge of his student loan 
debt because it imposed an undue hardship on him.147  The bankruptcy court 
concluded that Mr. Jesperson’s student loan debt imposed an undue hardship 
on him and discharged his debt.148  The district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court’s conclusion.149  ECMC appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Eighth Circuit.150 
 
 138. Id. at 552.  Over $61,000 of the debt was held by Educational Credit Manage-
ment Corporation and was the sole debt in question on appeal.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 551. 
 140. Id. at 553. 
 141. Id. at 554 (citing In re Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704). 
 142. Id. (citing In re Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704). 
 143. Id. (citing In re Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704). 
 144. Id. (citing In re Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704). 
 145. Id. (citing In re Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704). 
 146. 571 F.3d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
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The Eighth Circuit cited Long in reaffirming its use of the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis; the court also acknowledged that while a majority of 
circuits have adopted the Brunner test, only the Eighth Circuit or the Supreme 
Court of the United States can resolve the conflicting approaches to undue 
hardship determinations.151  The court of appeals reversed the district court and 
the bankruptcy court.152  The court concluded that the bankruptcy court’s de-
termination of undue hardship was based on clearly erroneous factual conclu-
sions in Mr. Jesperson’s case.153  The court found that Mr. Jesperson’s “young 
age, good health, number of degrees, marketable skills, and lack of substantial 
obligations to dependents or mental or physical impairments” established that 
his student loan debt did not impose an undue hardship.154  The court also em-
phasized Mr. Jesperson’s failure to attempt to repay any of his $304,463.62 
student loan debt owed to ECMC, as well as his failure to even attempt to enroll 
in an Income Contingent Repayment Plan (“ICRP”), which would have limited 
his monthly installment payments on his debt in proportion with his monthly 
income and allowed for discharge of any debt still remaining after twenty-five 
years of regular payments.155 
In addition to the Eighth Circuit’s departure from the Brunner test, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also distanced itself from the Brun-
ner test in Nash v. Connecticut Student Loan Foundation.156  In Nash, the 
debtor, Noreen Nash, sought the discharge of over $140,000 in student loans.157  
The bankruptcy court concluded that the debtor failed to carry her burden of 
proof for a showing of undue hardship.158  The bankruptcy court judge used a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach but concluded that both this test and the 
Brunner test essentially required analyses of the same factors.159  The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
determination but elaborated further that the statutory language supported a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test as “the default standard for all judging.”160  
Ms. Nash appealed the district court’s decision to the First Circuit.161 
 
 151. Id. at 779 n.1. 
 152. Id. at 778. 
 153. Id. at 779–83. 
 154. Id. at 780. 
 155. Id. at 781.  The court also rejected the bankruptcy court’s conclusion that Mr. 
Jesperson’s failure to enroll in the ICRP option was not a factor to be considered in 
determining undue hardship because the ICRP failed to provide Mr. Jesperson with the 
“fresh start” that bankruptcy discharge is supposed to provide to debtors.  Id. at 780. 
 156. 446 F.3d 188, 190 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 157. Id. at 189. 
 158. Id. at 190. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (quoting Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found., 330 B.R. 323, 326–27 (D. 
Mass. 2005), aff’d, 446 F.3d 188). 
 161. Id. at 189. 
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On appeal, the First Circuit declined to make a determination on which 
undue hardship test it should adopt.162  Instead, the court noted that “[u]nder 
any test assessing eligibility for discharge of student loan debt, [the debtor] 
must show that her current inability to maintain a minimal standard of living if 
forced to repay the debt will continue into the future.”163  Based on Ms. Nash’s 
lack of evidence demonstrating the long-term prognosis of her disability, the 
court of appeals concurred with the bankruptcy court that she failed to meet her 
burden of proof of undue hardship.164  The First Circuit concluded that based 
on either the Brunner test or the totality-of-the-circumstances test, Ms. Nash 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the repayment of her 
loans would cause her undue hardship.165 
More recently, in Bronsdon v. Educational Credit Management Corp., 
the BAP for the First Circuit addressed the different undue hardship tests.166  
In Bronsdon, the debtor, Denise Bronsdon, sought to have her student loan debt 
discharged in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding because repayment im-
posed an undue hardship on her.167  Analyzing Ms. Bronsdon’s claim under the 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the bankruptcy court determined that 
Ms. Bronsdon’s student loan debt imposed an undue hardship on her and dis-
charged her loans.168  The creditor, ECMC, appealed the bankruptcy court’s 
decision to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.169  The 
district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s decision and remanded the case to 
the bankruptcy court to consider “the impact that participation in the William 
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program . . . would have on the undue hardship 
analysis.”170  The bankruptcy court concluded that her failure to participate in 
that program was not sufficient to overcome a finding of undue hardship and 
discharged Ms. Bronsdon’s student loans again.171  ECMC again appealed, this 
time to the BAP for the First Circuit, arguing for the adoption of the Brunner 
test, which the bankruptcy court refused to endorse either time it reviewed Ms. 
Bronsdon’s case.172 
 
 162. Id. at 190 (finding “no need in this case to pronounce [its] views of a preferred 
method of identifying a case of ‘undue hardship’”). 
 163. Id. at 192. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 435 B.R. 791, 797–800 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010). 
 167. Id. at 793. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 793–94. 
 171. Id. at 794.  The bankruptcy court found that even under the William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program, Ms. Bronsdon would not be required to make any 
monthly payments because her income is too low.  Id. at 795.  In addition, at the end of 
the repayment period, the forgiveness of her student loan debt would cause tremendous 
tax liability to Ms. Bronsdon, who is currently only surviving on Social Security.  Id. 
 172. Id. at 797. 
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/12
2017] “UNDUE HARDSHIP” TEST 229 
The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s discharge of Ms. Bronsdon’s 
student loan debts based on the totality-of-the-circumstances test.173  The court 
acknowledged that not only had the First Circuit previously declined to adopt 
either of the undue hardship tests in Nash, but the BAP for the First Circuit 
declined to adopt either test in several prior cases.174  The court then went on 
to analyze the two tests and determine the differences between them.175  The 
court concluded that, while the tests converge in many areas, “the Brunner test 
imposes two additional requirements on the debtor that must be met if the stu-
dent loans are to be discharged.”176  The court reasoned the Brunner test places 
too much weight on a demonstration of “extraordinary circumstances” in order 
to demonstrate the present and future undue hardship imposed by the debtor’s 
student loans.177  In sum, the court concluded that “Brunner takes the test too 
far.”178  Thus, following the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the BAP 
found that the bankruptcy court properly considered Ms. Bronsdon’s eligibility 
for the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program as part of its totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis and affirmed the discharge of Ms. Bronsdon’s stu-
dent loan debt.179 
These cases have begun to draw a line in the sand between these undue 
hardship tests.  Even so, debtors continue to try to persuade the courts to change 
their analyses and their standards to help improve their chances of receiving a 
discharge of their student loan debt.  Ms. Conway is one such debtor who at-
tempted to persuade the Eighth Circuit to depart from the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The instant decision is based on almost six years’ worth of adversarial 
proceedings in the bankruptcy court regarding Ms. Conway’s outstanding stu-
dent loan debts.180  Ms. Conway received her Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge 
in 2010, but the discharge did not include any of her outstanding student loan 
debt.181  The bankruptcy court granted Ms. Conway’s motion to reopen her 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 797–98 n.9. 
 175. Id. at 798–99. 
 176. Id. at 799 (quoting Hicks v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 
18, 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005)). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 800.  Specifically, the court found that the “good faith” requirement of 
the Brunner test is “without textual foundation.”  Id. (quoting In re Hicks, 331 B.R. at 
28). 
 179. Id. at 804. 
 180. See Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. 828, 830–33. (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013), 
reversed and remanded, 495 B.R. 416 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), reversal aff’d, 559 F. 
App’x 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 181. Id. at 830. 
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case to address the dischargeability of her student loans.182  However, in its 
analysis, the court determined that Ms. Conway’s student loans did not impose 
an undue hardship and therefore did not meet the requirements under the Bank-
ruptcy Code to be dischargeable.183  On appeal, the BAP reversed the bank-
ruptcy court’s ruling and found that the undue hardship analysis should be con-
ducted on a loan-by-loan basis.184 
NCT appealed the BAP decision to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the 
BAP and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for an analysis of undue 
hardship on a loan-by-loan basis.185  The bankruptcy court determined that 
eleven of Ms. Conway’s fifteen student loans held by NCT imposed an undue 
hardship and discharged those eleven loans but found that the remaining four 
did not impose an undue hardship and denied the request to make them dis-
chargeable as well.186  Ms. Conway then appealed that decision to the BAP, 
arguing that the bankruptcy court attempted to inflate her income in order to 
impose undue hardship on her by disallowing the discharge of the remaining 
four student loans she had outstanding.187 
In this appeal, the BAP reviewed the bankruptcy court’s denial of a mo-
tion to amend the judgment with deference to the lower court, noting that such 
decisions will never be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.188  The BAP 
found no such abuse of discretion in this case.189  The BAP also addressed the 
issue of dischargeability of Ms. Conway’s student loan debt, which is a ques-
tion of law to be reviewed by the appellate court de novo.190  Factual findings, 
however, are only to be reviewed by the appellate court for clear error.191 
Ms. Conway’s arguments on appeal in the instant decision revolved 
around the allegedly arbitrary timeline the bankruptcy court created to deter-
mine which, if any, of Ms. Conway’s student loans imposed an undue hardship 
on her.192  The bankruptcy court created a timeframe from which to determine 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 836. 
 184. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. 416, 423–24 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 559 F. 
App’x 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 185. Conway 8th Cir., 559 F. App’x 610, 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 186. Conway Bankr. Ct. II, Ch. 7 Case No. 09-52394-399, Adv. No. 12-4033-659, 
slip op. at 6. (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2014), aff’d, 542 B.R. 855 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2015). 
 187. Conway B.A.P. II, 542 B.R. 855, 857 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2015). 
 188. Id. (first citing Suggs v. Regency Fin. Corp. (In re Suggs), 377 B.R. 198, 203 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007); and then citing Guy v. Danzig (In re Danzig), 233 B.R. 85, 93 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999)). 
 189. Id. at 859. 
 190. Id. at 857 (“The issue of dischargeability of student loans is a question of law, 
which we review de novo.”). 
 191. Id. (“A finding is clearly erroneous if, after examining the entire record, we 
are left with a definite and firm conviction that the bankruptcy court has made a mis-
take.”). 
 192. Id. 
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Ms. Conway’s monthly disposable income, using the most recent twelve-
month period for which Ms. Conway had provided financial information, No-
vember 2013 through October 2014.193  Ms. Conway argued that the court 
failed to consider additional pertinent events that affected the calculation of her 
disposable income, namely that she was laid off from one of her jobs two 
months after the court’s cut-off point.194 
The BAP rejected Ms. Conway’s arguments regarding changes in her in-
come, because in making post-discharge undue hardship determinations, the 
court relied on facts existing at trial that supported a finding of “reasonably 
reliable future financial resources.”195  In making such determinations of fact, 
the court is required to examine the totality of the circumstances; however, the 
court is not authorized to base factual findings on speculation or estimates.196  
The BAP noted, “A decision on the dischargeability of student loan debt will 
nearly always be akin to a judicial version of ‘Whack-A-Mole’ because a 
debtor’s income and expenses are seldom static.  Life is like that.”197  The BAP 
pointed out that it had recognized Ms. Conway’s fluctuating income and ex-
penses when viewed on a month-to-month basis but reasoned that her financial 
resources appeared more stable when viewed on a yearly basis.198  It was for 
that reason, the court pointed out, that the BAP requested the bankruptcy court 
base its findings on Ms. Conway’s ability to repay individual loans over the 
course of an entire year.199 
The court also emphasized the inherently subjective nature of discharge-
ability determinations and recognized that “[t]he courts are not equipped to re-
visit a nondischargeability determination every time a debtor’s circumstances 
change; to do so would wreak havoc with the concept of the finality of a court 
order.”200  Ultimately, the court found that the bankruptcy court had properly 
reviewed a full year of Ms. Conway’s income and expenses and made a factual 
determination based on the most complete set of information provided by the 
parties.201  Therefore, even though Ms. Conway felt that the remaining four 
student loans imposed a financial hardship on her, the bankruptcy court’s con-
clusion was not clearly erroneous, and thus it did not abuse its discretion. 
 
 193. Id. at 856. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 858. 
 196. Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 1227, 1233 
(8th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court may not engage in speculation when determining net income 
and reasonable and necessary living expenses.” (quoting Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Jesperson (In re Jesperson), 571 F.3d 775, 780 (8th Cir. 2009))). 
 197. Conway B.A.P. II, 542 B.R. at 858. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 858–59. 
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V.  COMMENT 
Ms. Conway’s case provides an example of the complicated and often 
ambiguous analysis of student loan debt discharge under the Bankruptcy Code.  
Based on the vague statutory language and varying interpretations of both the 
statute and the tests created to address the statute, debtors across the United 
States are left entirely unsure and unprepared for what might happen to their 
outstanding student loan debt in bankruptcy.  This Part examines further the 
two currently accepted tests used by courts across the country and ultimately 
concludes that, due to the inherently subjective nature of these types of facts-
and-circumstances tests, they should be altogether rejected in favor of a bright-
line rule in which only federal student loan debt remains non-dischargeable and 
private student loans become dischargeable in bankruptcy.  Next, this Part 
looks to the characterization of student loans as non-dischargeable debts.  This 
Part then presents a possible solution to the current circuit split and ambiguities 
of Congress’s “undue hardship” analysis requirement.  Finally, this Part looks 
forward to the implications involved in the creation of a bright-line rule for 
discharging student loan debt in bankruptcy. 
A.  Facts-and-Circumstances Tests 
As written, § 523(a)(8) requires courts to create and adopt a facts-and-
circumstances test in order to make undue hardship determinations.  Facts-and-
circumstances tests necessarily require the courts to factor in specific individ-
ual facts and circumstances of each debtor’s case before them.  This inherently 
creates inconsistent rulings across bankruptcy courts and jurisdictions.202  Alt-
hough individual facts and circumstances are never evaluated in a vacuum, the 
use of such inherently subjective tests leads to disparate results.203 
 
 202. See Quixada Moore-Vissing, U. of N.H. Dep’t of Educ., Inconsistency in Ju-
dicial Interpretations of Undue Hardship: The Complications of Student Loan Dis-
charge Through Bankruptcy 10 (from the 29th Ann. Student Fin. Aid Res. Network 
Conf., June 15, 2012), http://www.pellinstitute.org/downloads/sfarn_2012-Moore-
Vissing_061512.pdf; Ryan Freeman, Comment, Student-Loan Discharge – An Empir-
ical Study of the Undue Hardship Provision of § 523(a)(8) Under Appellate Review, 30 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 147 (2013); Aaron N. Taylor, Undo Undue Hardship: An Ob-
jective Approach to Discharging Federal Student Loans in Bankruptcy, 38 J. LEGIS. 
185 (2012). 
 203. See Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy 
Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 405, 487 (2005) (“Debtors whose claim of undue hardship was analyzed pursuant 
to the Brunner test received a discharge approximately 49% of the time, whereas debt-
ors whose claim of undue hardship was analyzed pursuant to the totality test received 
a discharge approximately 46% of the time.”); but see Jason Iuliano, supra note 11, at 
497 (finding no statistically significant differences between outcomes in Brunner cir-
cuits and the Eighth Circuit). 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/12
2017] “UNDUE HARDSHIP” TEST 233 
Even within the limitations of judicial tests, like the Brunner test or the 
totality-of-the-circumstances test, the results that follow from facts-and-cir-
cumstance tests begin to look incongruent.  For example, where one court may 
determine that a debtor with bipolar disorder faces an undue hardship in repay-
ment of her student loans, another court may find that a second debtor with 
bipolar disorder who possesses other distinct facts and circumstances revolving 
around her life will be capable of repaying her student loans without undue 
hardship.  No two bankruptcies are identical, and the courts are left weighing 
one debtor against another.  The court in Brunner attempted to limit the incon-
sistencies in undue hardship analyses by creating a tripartite test for courts to 
apply to each demand for a discharge of student loans.204  The court in Long 
also attempted to limit inconsistencies in its creation of the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test.205  These two prevailing undue hardship tests have been 
adopted by all eleven circuits, nine following the Brunner test and two cur-
rently following the totality-of-the-circumstances test.206 
The result is cases like In re Conway, where the bankruptcy court initially 
determined that, because Ms. Conway capably and intelligently represented 
herself, and therefore had the potential for more gainful employment, her stu-
dent loan repayment would not impose an undue hardship on her.207  Such a 
finding would seem to highlight the inconsistent effects these tests have when 
compared with a case like Rose v. Department of Education, where the bank-
ruptcy court found that a licensed pro se attorney should have her student loan 
debt discharged in part due to her poor representation of herself in her own 
bankruptcy proceedings, which indicated to the court that gainful employment 
was not likely in the future.208  In either case, many other factors were consid-
ered by the court, but it seems that courts also take into account the debtors’ 
presentations of themselves in court, which can be affected by personal per-
ceptions and interactions with debtors and can cloud courts’ analyses of debt-
ors’ other arguments and circumstances.  Should our system really fall prey to 
such subjective notions and interpretations of intelligence, instead of limiting 
the analysis to factors like work history, accommodations, family circum-
stances, or disability? 
 
 204. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 
1987) (per curiam). 
 205. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
 206. See supra note 132 and accompanying text for cases following the Brunner 
test.  See supra note 133 and accompanying text for cases following the totality-of-the-
circumstances test. 
 207. Conway Bankr. Ct. I, 489 B.R. 828, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2013), reversed and 
remanded, 495 B.R. 416 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), reversal aff’d, 559 F. App’x 610 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 208. 215 B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (concluding that the debtor’s stu-
dent loans should be discharged, in part, because the debtor’s pro se representation of 
herself in the case was so poor that the court highly doubted the debtor’s ability to 
procure “more lucrative employment in the foreseeable future”). 
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If facts-and-circumstances tests revolve around subjective analyses in or-
der to make undue hardship determinations, why has Congress created this sub-
jective system instead of creating a bright-line rule for student loan discharges?  
Clearly, the creation and passage of this section of the Bankruptcy Code was a 
reaction to a perceived injustice or loophole in the law.209  But does such a 
subjective analysis, like the Brunner test and the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test that stemmed from the creation of § 523(a)(8), resolve the issues that Con-
gress identified prior to the creation of the non-dischargeability of student 
loans?  Is there a better place to draw the line? 
Based on the analysis provided above, neither test adopted currently by 
the circuit courts provides a clear answer to the growing problem student loan 
debt has created in the United States.  Rather than allowing courts across the 
country to continue to parse out the minor differences between two equally 
insufficient facts-and-circumstances tests, Congress should altogether reject a 
subjective facts-and-circumstances analysis and create a bright-line rule.  In 
order to find a different standard for discharging student loans in bankruptcy, 
we must discuss the two major ways students can get student loans: federal 
student loan programs and private bank student loan programs.210  Addition-
ally, in order to determine if there exists a more consistent standard by which 
courts or Congress can determine the dischargeability of student loans, we must 
address the current statutory scheme and the social and economic implications 
of this system. 
B.  Non-Dischargeable Debts 
Debts excepted from discharge in bankruptcy are primarily based on some 
sort of wrongdoing on the part of the debtor.211  As discussed in Part III, these 
include debts incurred by fraud or false representation, embezzlement, criminal 
restitution,212 punitive damages,213 and wrongful death damages where the 
debtor was intoxicated.214  The other main category of non-dischargeable debts 
are those that implicate government resources, such as taxes, fines, and penal-
ties,215 and alimony and child support obligations,216 which debtors’ spouses 
and children often rely on for basic necessities.217  In the mix with all these 
non-dischargeable debts are student loan debts – debts incurred for the lofty 
goal of continuing education and self-improvement.  
 209. See supra Part III on the legislative history of § 523(a)(8). 
 210. Private Student Loans, supra note 107. 
 211. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012). 
 212. Id. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), 523(a)(4). 
 213. Id. § 523(a)(6). 
 214. Id. § 523(a)(9). 
 215. Id. §§ 523(a)(1), (14). 
 216. Id. §§ 523(a)(15), (5). 
 217. Discharge, Exceptions to Discharge, and Objections to Discharge, NAT’L 
BANKR. REV. COMM’N, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.html (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
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C.  The Solution 
Federal student loans should remain non-dischargeable in bankruptcy be-
cause of their status as public debts, because they fall within the category of 
government resources, and because the U.S. Department of Education has cre-
ated many alternative ways for borrowers to repay their loans.  As previously 
discussed,218 there are several federal student loan repayment plans and defer-
ral options that allow the government to work with each individual borrower 
and provide a plan or system of repayment that they can actually afford each 
month.  Additionally, while federal student loan caps have remained consistent 
since 2008 and were not amended prior to that since 1992,219 private student 
loan interest rates have skyrocketed, in part because tuition costs across the 
country have substantially increased.220  Additionally, most borrowers do not 
ever attempt to discharge their student loan debt, meaning that only a small 
portion of borrowers would attempt to get their federal loans discharged under 
an undue hardship analysis.221 
Private student loans present a different problem.  Private lenders set their 
own limits on how much to lend to any given student, and with so many pos-
sible options, it is possible for students to accumulate debt from multiple pri-
vate lenders to finance their educations.222  This can also lead to larger amounts 
of debt per student.223  Take Ms. Conway, for example.  At the time when she 
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, she had approximately $118,500 in private stu-
dent loans and $18,000 in federal student loans.224  Her federal student loans 
were not even brought into her adversary proceeding when she requested dis-
charge of her student loan debt.225  Ms. Conway was enrolled in an income-
based repayment plan for her federal loans that lowered her monthly payments  
 218. See supra Part III. 
 219. Historical Loan Limits, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/historicallim-
its.phtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2017). 
 220. See Kantrowitz, supra note 7 (“Student loan debt is increasing because gov-
ernment grants and support for postsecondary education have failed to keep pace with 
increases in college costs.  This has shifted much of the burden of paying for college 
from the federal and state governments to families.  The government no longer carries 
its fair share of college costs, even though it gets a big increase in income tax revenue 
from college graduates.”). 
 221. Jennifer Grant & Lindsay Anglin, Note, Student Loan Debt: The Next Bubble?, 
32-DEC AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 87 (2013) (“[A] 2007 study found that of the 169,774 
debtors in bankruptcy with student loan debt, only 217 filed an adversary proceeding 
in an effort to discharge their loans.”). 
 222. Private Student Loan Lenders for 2017, LENDEDU, 
https://lendedu.com/blog/private-student-loans/ (last updated Feb. 1, 2017). 
 223. A Look at the Shocking Student Loan Debt Statistics for 2017, STUDENT LOAN 
HERO, https://studentloanhero.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/ (last visited Feb. 7, 
2017). 
 224. Conway B.A.P. I, 495 B.R. 416, 418 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 559 F. 
App’x 610 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 
 225. Id. 
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based on her annual income.226  In contrast, Ms. Conway argued in her request 
for discharge of her private student loan debt that there was not any kind of 
income-contingent repayment option available to her on her private student 
loans.227  Without any alternative repayment plans, Ms. Conway would proba-
bly be indebted to ECMC for the rest of her life, all for wanting to get an edu-
cation. 
Total student loan debt in the United States is estimated to be around $1.2 
trillion, with 95 percent of it being backed by the federal government.228  If § 
523(a)(8) were to be amended to make only private student loans dischargea-
ble, it would thus only affect 5 percent of the current student loan debt nation-
ally.  In addition, making private student loan debt dischargeable in bankruptcy 
would take away the incentive for private lenders to use adjustable interest rates 
that are often more than double the federal interest rates.229  Alternatively, mak-
ing private student loan debt dischargeable would incentivize private lenders 
to be more stringent in their eligibility requirements, knowing that the loans 
are dischargeable, and may cause fewer people to qualify for loans with higher 
adjustable interest rates that end up costing the borrowers far more money in 
the long run.  Non-dischargeable federal student loans also pose less of a hard-
ship for borrowers because four out of the seven available repayment plans for 
federal loans provide for forgiveness of outstanding debt after a twenty- or 
twenty-five-year repayment period, meaning that the debt does not follow bor-
rowers around for their entire lives if they can prove that they are unable to 
repay the full loan amount in fewer than twenty-five years.230 
Economically, this makes sense: private lenders have no accountability 
for their high interest rates – currently, they are taking advantage of the system 
by charging interest rates to borrowers who really should not be taking out 
loans because the lenders know the loans they give out cannot be discharged 
in bankruptcy.  Making private loans dischargeable would incentivize private 
lenders to be more stringent with their eligibility requirements and should 
greatly reduce the amount of loans private lenders would approve, knowing 
that their loans are now dischargeable. 
D.  Implications 
There are important financial implications for debtors in drawing a line 
between federal student loan debt and private student loan debt.  Particularly, 
differentiating between federal and private student loans superficially creates a 
 
 226. Id. at 416 n.4. 
 227. Id. 
 228. John T. Harvey, Student Loan Debt Crisis?, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johntharvey/2014/04/28/student-loan-debt-cri-
sis/#771efeaa614d. 
 229. For a comparison chart of available private student loans, see Private Student 
Loans, supra note 107. 
 230. Interest Rates and Fees, supra note 111. 
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disparity for debtors.  For example, a single debtor with only private student 
loans who falls on hard times would have the option of discharging all of her 
student loan debt in her bankruptcy pleading.  Whereas, a similarly situated 
debtor with only federal student loans would not have the option of discharging 
her student loan debt in a bankruptcy proceeding – instead, she would have to 
make payments and allow the debt to follow her around for twenty-five years 
before it could be forgiven.  On its face, this seems to give preferential treat-
ment to borrowers of private student loans.  However, in many cases where a 
debtor is facing bankruptcy and where a debtor’s income is not sufficient to 
pay his or her debts, the same limited income would allow the debtor to take 
part in the alternative repayment plans offered for federal student loan debt, 
like income-based repayment or income-contingent repayment plans.231 
Beyond the direct implications of discharging debt in bankruptcy, there 
are less obvious aspects of the discharge of debts that should be seriously con-
sidered when creating a standard for student loan debt discharge.  Allowing 
student loan debt to be dischargeable in bankruptcy provides a very real benefit 
in its tax consequences.  Generally speaking, when a debt is discharged or for-
given, it is ordinary income to the debtor at the time of the discharge.232  If – 
as with most student loan debt – the amount of the debt that is discharged is 
fairly large, this treatment of debt forgiven as ordinary income can impose an 
enormous, unexpected tax burden on debtors.  For example, currently, the av-
erage student loan debt for a Missouri resident is $27,480 plus interest.  Includ-
ing this amount of money in income can create a tax burden for the debtor.233  
However, where a debtor is in need of having her student loan debts discharged, 
there is an exception to the inclusion of the discharged debt amount in income.  
 
 231. Id.  In many cases where a debtor’s income is so low that she is unable to repay 
all of her debts, her monthly installment payment on her federal student loans would be 
insignificant, if not zero dollars.  In such cases, the debtor would be paying little to 
nothing on her debt for twenty-five years before the debt would be discharged.  This 
would end up affecting borrowers of federal student loans in a similar fashion as bor-
rowers of private student loans who declare bankruptcy and have their student loans 
discharged. 
 232. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2012). 
 233. For example, suppose a single Missouri college graduate had $27,480 in stu-
dent loan debt and had an annual household income of $48,173 (the median household 
income for a Missouri resident as of the 2010 U.S. Census in 2015 dollars).  Project on 
Student Debt: State by State Data, INST. FOR C. ACCESS & SUCCESS, http://ti-
cas.org/posd/map-state-data#overlay=posd/state_data/2016/mo (last visited Feb. 14, 
2017); Quick Facts: Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quick-
facts/table/INC110215/29 (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).  In the taxable year that this 
debtor’s student loans were discharged, her taxable income would increase from 
$44,000 to $69,844 ($44,000 + $25,844).  This would mean this debtor’s tax liability 
would increase from $7235 to $13,696.  Our debtor would be liable for almost twice as 
much tax, even though she did not actually receive any additional income or money 
during that year. 
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Under § 108(a)(1)(B), if the debtor is insolvent234 at the time the debt is dis-
charged, the debtor does not have to include the discharged amount in in-
come.235 
Economists and politicians have been debating the causes and impacts of 
the rising student loan rates and outstanding debt for years.236  Part of this de-
bate has been a discussion of whether this “student loan crisis” will eventually 
resemble the housing bubble and its burst between 2007 and 2009.237  An ar-
gument can be made that this proposal would make it harder to get out from 
under these student loan debts, and that this could accelerate the arrival of this 
looming issue.  While this is a serious concern for our economy and the future 
of student loan accessibility, this proposal would not have that effect.  There 
are three vital considerations to keep in mind supporting this proposal.  First, 
while the amount of outstanding student loan debt has been dramatically in-
creasing in recent years, the true “problem” many debtors face in trying to re-
pay their student loan debt is the accruing of interest at high rates.  Second, 
private lenders of student loans hold only approximately 5 percent of the out-
standing student loan debt, however, they also appear more frequently in re-
quests for discharge in bankruptcy proceedings.238  This proposal only seeks to 
allow private loans to be dischargeable, which would not affect the majority of 
outstanding student loan debt.  Third, the creation of a bright-line rule would 
reduce the cost of litigation in bankruptcy filings and proceedings; this would 
 
 234. I.R.C. § 108(d)(3). 
 235. Id. § 108(a)(1)(B).  Instead, there is a toll charge exacted from the debtor re-
quiring her to reduce her basis in her tax attributes by the amount of the debt discharged 
that was excluded from income.  Id. § 108(b).  Under the code, the debtor’s tax attrib-
utes shall be reduced in the following order: net operating losses, general business cred-
its, minimum tax credits, capital loss carryovers, the basis of the taxpayer’s property, 
passive activity loss and credit carryovers, and foreign tax credit carryovers.  Id. 
 236. See Hayward, supra note 3; Mohamed A. El-Erian, Opinion, The U.S. Educa-
tion Bubble Is Now Upon Us, MKT. WATCH (Nov. 9, 2015, 9:26 AM), http://www.mar-
ketwatch.com/story/the-us-education-bubble-is-now-upon-us-2015-11-09. 
 237. See William S. Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton 
Law School, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 485, 488 (2011) (“An eerie conceptual analogy to 
the student loan crises can be found in the American housing market in the first decade 
of the new millennium.  The paradigms are: (1) specific identifiable market forces cause 
both the housing market and the higher education market to inflate faster than the ‘nor-
mal’ rate of inflation; (2) politicians respond by creating short-sighted programs that 
loan money to consumers who can then buy these “goods” at the inflated prices instead 
of identifying the inflation’s root causes; and (3) these programs inject excessive lev-
erage into the markets and exacerbate the problem by turning the market’s homeostasis 
regulation mechanism into a vicious inflationary cycle.”). 
 238. In a cursory study of the eleven bankruptcy cases from across the country ad-
dressing student loan debt discharge examined in this Note, disputes over privately held 
student loan debt consisted of 81 percent of cases, or nine of the eleven, where disputes 
over federally funded student loans appeared in only 18 percent of these cases.  See 
cases cited supra notes 132–33. 
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save debtors thousands of dollars spent disputing whether or not they can afford 
to pay these debts. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The use of subjective facts-and-circumstances tests in determining undue 
hardship leads to disparate results across the country for debtors attempting to 
escape their burdensome debts in bankruptcy.  Congress’s inclusion of student 
loan debt as a non-dischargeable debt seems to imply a distrust of students as 
a whole, likening student loan debts to fraud, judgments for punitive damages, 
and back child support and alimony.  When teens and young adults are strongly 
encouraged to pursue college degrees, whether by family, educators, or the pre-
sent job market, penalizing attempts by students to fund their post-secondary 
education is an undue burden in and of itself.  Rather than penalizing students 
for taking on loans to better themselves, especially using subjective tests for 
determining the undue hardship of such debt, Congress should provide a more 
transparent and objective standard by which debtors entering into the twists 
and turns of bankruptcy filings can expect some form of consistency in terms 
of discharge and treatment.  One such way to provide a more transparent de-
termination for treatment of student loan debt in bankruptcy discharge is by 
repealing the undue hardship requirement and creating a bright-line rule for the 
courts that distinguishes federal student loan debt from private student loan 
debt for courts to follow.  While Congress should still work to reform the fed-
eral student loan programs, the creation of this bright-line rule will begin to 
furnish debtors with the fresh start the bankruptcy statutes were originally en-
acted to provide. 
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